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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether gender, age, ethnicity, and geography affect the choice of equity 
crowdfunding offerings vs initial public offerings (IPO) on traditional stock markets and whether 
these characteristics increase the likelihood of a successful offering. Using 167 equity offerings in 
Crowdcube and 99 equity offerings on London’s Alternative Investment Market raising between 
£300,000  and £5m, we find that companies with younger top management team (TMT) members 
are both more likely to launch equity crowdfunding offerings than IPOs, and have higher chances to 
successfully complete an equity crowdfunding offering. Remotely located companies are more 
likely to launch equity crowdfunding offerings than IPOs and have higher chances to successfully 
complete an equity crowdfunding offering. On the contrary, female entrepreneurs do not have 
higher chances to raise funds in equity crowdfunding. Minority entrepreneurs do not have higher 
chances of successfully raising capital but do attract a higher number of investors.  Overall, our 
evidence provides empirical guidance for the first time to the oft-repeated policy claim that equity 
crowdfunding democratizes entrepreneurial finance by providing access to funding to 
underrepresented groups of potential entrepreneurs. 
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1. Introduction 
A growing interest in crowdfunding is shared by practitioners, policymakers, the media, and 
scholars alike. As a new and powerful tool for entrepreneurs, crowdfunding can help push the 
boundaries of existing theories and help develop new ones. In fact, new digital and information 
communication technologies (ICT) have transformed the nature of uncertainty inherent in 
entrepreneurial processes and outcomes as well as the ways of dealing with such uncertainty 
(Nambisan et al., 2017). ICT can indeed alleviate some of the problems of traditional 
entrepreneurial finance markets and solve market failure.  
As a parallelism, we look at the impact of ICT on urban bike-sharing programs. Already in 1965, 
Provos released the White Bike Plan in Amsterdam. With no record of who checked out which bike, 
the plan failed a few weeks after as bikes were often stolen or damaged. After many other attempts, 
in 1995, a coin-deposit system was established in Copenhagen (Bycyken), with 2,000 
distinguishable bicycles with docking stations. Nevertheless, the program was terminated due to 
frequent thefts and damages attributed customer anonymity. More recently, Shaheen et al. (2010) 
report that in 2009 bike-sharing programs were operating with 150,000 bikes in 125 (mostly 
European) cities. The estimates grow to over 1m bikes in 800 bike-sharing programs in 2014 
(Campbell et al., 2016). In 2017, Beijing banned new shared bikes as riders can already access 
2.5m. Currently, urban bike-sharing programs run station-less scan&ride systems with real-time 
monitoring of occupancy, credit scores, and penalties, that ultimately allows for selection of users. 
This parallelism shows that ICT has the potential to lower information asymmetries and alleviate 
market failure problems. 
Similarly, ICT can reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems in entrepreneurial finance. 
As far as the availability of finance is a critical element to entrepreneurship, understanding why 
some categories of individuals are underrepresented in entrepreneurship is a question of both 
academic and social interest. For instance, the paucity of ethnic entrepreneurs or the unequal access 
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between genders to the necessary resources to establish sustainable new ventures has received 
increasing media attention. To add to this debate, this paper investigates whether crowdfunding is as 
inclusive as often portrayed. The expectation is indeed that by replacing a small set of homogeneous 
experts with a diverse crowd, the significance of a founder’s gender or race will decline. In 
particular, existing studies have found a more pronounced diversity in sophistication and experience 
among investors in equity crowdfunding relative to traditional equity offerings (Cumming et al., 
2018).1 While professional investors follow a market logic also when investing in crowdfunding, 
small, unsophisticated investors are found to consider community logic (Vismara, 2018b). 
Clear associations between gender, ethnic or geographic disadvantage and funding are difficult to 
isolate given that exogenous variables intrude into the process of finance and performance in 
general. There is, in general, conflicting or scarce evidence regarding whether fundraising via 
crowdfunding platforms is actually easier for traditionally underrepresented groups. In particular, 
most of the existing studies focus on a specific aspect, such as gender or geography, in the context 
of reward-based crowdfunding. Equity-based crowdfunding is, however, intrinsically different from 
reward-based crowdfunding. While in equity crowdfunding, the proponent is by definition a 
company, reward-based campaigns are launched mostly by individuals. The motivations to bid for a 
reward are also likely to be different from those to invest in a company’s equity. Coherently, 
Vismara (2016) finds that offering rewards to investors does not increase the probability of success 
of equity crowdfunding campaigns. The governance and organizational implications of the process 
of raising equity capital through crowdfunding are arguably different from those of pre-selling a 
product or a service in reward-based crowdfunding (Cumming et al., 2018). Consistently, prior 
1 While the majority of recent IPOs have been offered exclusively to institutional investors, crowdfunding 
investors are likely to be much more diverse. Over the last two decades, three quarters of the IPOs in Europe 
took place in secondary markets, such as London’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Most of these 
IPOs were offered exclusively to institutional investors (Vismara, Paleari, & Ritter, 2012). Although 
institutional investors are being allocated the largest fraction of IPO shares (Aggarwal, Prabhala, & Puri, 
2002), equity crowdfunding is likely to attract a much more diverse set of investors. 
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studies on minorities in crowdfunding are mainly based on consumer theory (e.g., Younkin and 
Kuppuswamy, 2017).  
Crowdfunding platforms allow anyone to view projects posted online, allowing for a more 
heterogeneous population of backers. This results in a promising path to funding categories that 
typically find it difficult to deal with business angels or venture capitalists (VCs). Recent research 
has indeed shown that these private investors bid in equity crowdfunding (Signori and Vismara, 
2018). The complementarity between crowdfunding and early-stage private equity makes it more 
appealing for entrepreneurs to launch a crowdfunding campaign, as the availability of professional 
investors will help in case low participation by small investors (Schwienbacher, 2018). In private 
equity, the deal is between the entrepreneur and a restricted number of providers of capital. 
Entrepreneurs can choose who they deal with and are able to negotiate the terms of the contract, 
including the price and amount of shares. In equity crowdfunding, instead, offerings are open to the 
public. Once the offering is listed on the crowdfunding platform, the price is fixed and the 
ownership structure is solely defined by investors’ demand for shares. For this reason, we believe 
that traditional initial public offerings (IPOs) represent a more appropriate term of comparison for 
equity crowdfunding offerings than private equity deals. Interviews with practitioners support this 
contention. For instance, Marcus Stuttard, Head of AIM and UK Primary Markets at London Stock 
Exchange Group, has recently declared that both IPos and equity crowdfunding offerings 
“democratise how equity investments are made and make it easier for people to invest. Equity 
crowdfunding was the first step – and, after all, the stock market was one of the original forms of 
crowdfunding”.2 
While traditional private deals are limited to a relatively small group of private investors, equity 
crowdfunding allows issuers to broadly solicit and advertise their securities to the general public, 
thereby increasing the diversification of potential investors. Two decades ago, online auction IPOs 
2 https://www.syndicateroom.com/learn/investor-tools-reports/why-aim-needs-crowdfunding-an-interview-
with-marcus-stuttard 
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were viewed as alternatives to the traditional book-building method of IPO underwriting (Ritter, 
2013). However, despite being considered an efficient market mechanism to lower the costs of 
going public, the expectations of online auction IPOs were never realized. Only one investment 
bank, W.R. Hambrecht, has developed a platform for online public offerings, and only 20 
companies in the US, most notably Google, have gone public this way, with the last occurring in 
2007 (Ritter, 2013). Despite the unmatched expectations of democratization and disintermediation, 
IPOs in traditional stock markets are the closest term of comparison for equity crowdfunding 
offerings. 
The present paper is among the first to empirically assess the potential of equity crowdfunding to 
finance underrepresented categories of entrepreneurs. Specifically, we believe that democratization 
in entrepreneurial finance should be investigated along four dimensions, namely geography, age, 
gender, and ethnicity biases. If equity crowdfunding is effectively democratizing access to funding, 
it should provide means of financing to these four categories which are typically referred to as 
financially constrained. This paper, therefore, investigates the democratization potential of equity 
crowdfunding from a broader perspective then previous studies. Most importantly, this paper 
integrates the analysis of the determinants of success of the offerings with a first-stage investigation 
of the self-selection into equity crowdfunding. We compare a sample of 167 equity offerings in 
Crowdcube, the world largest equity crowdfunding platform, with 99 IPOs on the loosely regulated 
London’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM). These two samples were identified by including 
only offerings in Crowdcube or on the AIM between 2013 and 2016, raising more than £300,000 
and less than £5 million.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous studies and present our hypotheses. 
Section 3 illustrates the research design. Econometric results are reported in Section 4, and 
conclusions are provided in Section 5. 
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2. Literature review and hypotheses 
This paper is not the first to question whether crowdfunding democratizes access to finance, by 
investigating whether individuals discriminated by traditional financial institutions have more 
opportunities when targeting crowdfunding. Some previous studies have looked at specific 
individual characteristics of entrepreneurs such as gender and race (Catalini et al., 2016; Pope and 
Sydnor, 2011; Marom et al., 2016; Greenberg and Mollick, 2017; Younkin and Kuppuswamy, 
2017). In this Section, we review the entrepreneurial finance literature with regard to four 
dimensions, namely gender, age, ethnicity, and geography. 
2.1. Gender 
Gender differences in capital markets do exist. Although there is no evidence of discrimination in 
terms of approval/turndown rates, few women apply for debt capital (Cavalluzzo et al. 2002) and 
they are charged a higher interest rate on their loans or have greater collateral requirements 
compared to men (Coleman 2000; Fabowale et al. 1995; Riding & Swift 1990). Gender skewness is 
more evident in accessing external equity, women receive a substantially smaller proportion of VC 
financing than men do. Part of the motivations points to gender differences in human capital, social 
capital or growth aspirations, or differences between men’s and women’s ventures (Carter & Rosa 
1998). Women are less likely to have prior entrepreneurial or/and managerial experience and to 
participate in networks with high net worth individuals (Verheul & Thurik 2001). Stereotypically, 
masculine characteristics associated with leader emergence (Fagenson 1993) may attract VCs, as 
they expect a funded venture to grow rapidly in term of sales and profits. Additionally, male 
dominance among VCs and traditions related to investment in male-dominated industries (Greene et 
al. 2001) impact the gender bias in entrepreneurial finance. 3 
3 Brush et al. (2004) document that although women own more than 30 percent of US businesses, they 
receive less than 5 percent of venture capital funds distributed annually. The angel market is predominantly 
comprised of male investors. Only about 10 percent of VCs and less than 15 percent of business angels are 
women. In addition, only 15% of women-led companies were successful in raising capital, as compared with 
22% for male-led companies (Stengel, 2015). 
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Gender studies in crowdfunding see it as more democratic, at least relative to traditional seed 
investors such as business angels. In reward crowdfunding, females are more likely to successful 
raise capital than male founders, all else being equal. Marom et al. (2016) find that women make up 
about 35 percent of the project leaders and 44 percent of the investors on the Kickstarter platform. 
Using data from a laboratory experiment, Greenberg and Mollick (2017) document that women are 
more likely to succeed at a reward-based crowdfunding campaign and this effect primarily holds for 
female founders proposing technological projects. Radford (2016) uses data from DonorsChoose, a 
US-based crowdfunding website for public school teachers, to document that inequality only 
emerges after educators’ identities were published. Deanonymization (teachers’ identities were 
hidden until 2008) caused inequality to emerge across all types of gender difference. Using data 
from a Swedish crowdfunding platform, Mohammadi and Shafi (2018) find that female investors 
are more likely to invest in projects in which the proportion of male investors is higher.  
Some of the arguments to support the above mentioned studies, however, apply more to reward-
based crowdfunding than to equity crowdfunding. While men are guided by agentic goals, and 
therefore, focus more on the pursuit of personal achievement, women are guided by communal 
goals and put more emphasis on the development of interpersonal relationships (Carlson 1972). 
They also have stronger feelings than men about ethical issues concerning disclosure (Roxas & 
Stoneback 2004). The social role theory of leadership (Eagly et al. 1995) contends that female 
leaders are more likely to show concern for people, whereas male leaders are more likely to possess 
traits that reinforce competition. This line of thought is in line with the decision to donate or to bid 
small amounts of money to pledge rewards. The motivations to become costumers in reward-based 
crowdfunding are indeed likely more linked to ethical motivation than in entrepreneurial financial 
markets (Vismara, 2018a). 
For this reason, the equity crowdfunding market offers a complementary perspective, at the 
crossroad between entrepreneurial and consumer finance. So far, the evidence is rather mixed. In a 
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study of the UK platform Crowdcube, Vismara et al. (2016) find that female investors in female-led 
businesses are twice those in male-led businesses. Using projects listed on German platforms, 
Prokop and Wang (2018) find that equity crowdfunding campaigns initiated by women attract fewer 
investors, as well as lower funding amounts than those initiated by men. In this study, we test 
whether female-led companies are more likely to launch equity crowdfunding offerings than IPOs 
and whether they have higher chances to successfully complete an equity crowdfunding offering. 
 
Hypothesis 1a. Female-led companies are more likely to launch equity crowdfunding offerings than 
IPOs. 
Hypothesis 1b. Female-led companies have higher chances to successfully complete an equity 
crowdfunding offering. 
 
2.2. Age 
Bill Gates founded Microsoft in 1975 at age nineteen. Just four years after the relevant state passed 
legislation lowering the age of contractual capacity from 21 to 18 (Manes and Andrews, 1993). 
More recently, Mark Zuckerberg co-founded Facebook at age nineteen. These two examples offer 
an idea of the importance of the young entrepreneurship, which has been so far underinvestigated. 
On one hand, entrepreneurial intention decrease with age, due to the increasing opportunity cost of 
time with age (Lévesque and Minniti 2006). On the other, entrepreneurial opportunities increase 
with age because of higher accumulated physical, social, and human capital (Lee and Vouchilas 
2016). Coherently, entrepreneurial propensity is found to increase with age in some studies (Fairlie 
et al. 2016) but declining in others (Parker 2009). Zhang and Acs (2018) argue that the relationship 
between age and entrepreneurship depends on the type of entrepreneurship, as non-novice and 
novice entrepreneurs have significantly different skills, competencies, and information. They find 
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that entrepreneurial propensity of novice (versus non-novice) entrepreneurs has a U-shaped age 
trend dipping around age 60, while the propensity of full-time (versus part-time) declines since age 
30s. 
Studies on equity crowdfunding have so far neglected the role of the age of the proponents. On one 
hand, the experience of the founders might be perceived positively by external investors. In a quasi-
equity crowdfunding context, Piva and Rossi-Lamastra (2017) find that entrepreneurs’ 
entrepreneurial experience significantly contribute to entrepreneurs’ success in equity 
crowdfunding. Nevertheless, crowdfunding has the potential to broaden the categories of 
individuals raising external equity also with regard to age. Schwartz (2015) argues that teens are 
well positioned to exploit this new opportunity, with the upshot being that securities crowdfunding 
may become an important way for youthful entrepreneurs. For these reasons, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2a. Companies with younger TMT members are more likely to launch equity 
crowdfunding offerings than IPOs. 
Hypothesis 2b. Companies with younger TMT members have higher chances to successfully 
complete an equity crowdfunding offering. 
 
2.3. Ethnicity 
The role of ethnicity in entrepreneurship and the underrepresentation of minorities among the 
population of funded ventures (Aldrich and Waldinger, 1990) is the subject of increasing attention. 
Fairlie and Robb (2007) show that the availability of startup capital is conditioned by race. 
Similarly, the argument for gender bias, an explanation for this underrepresentation is that resource 
providers are biased against minority founders, thereby ascribing the bias also to pre-entry 
constraints. The theory of statistical discrimination (Arrow 1998) suggests that prospective 
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supporters use race as a proxy for unobserved traits that indicate the investment is more likely to 
fail (Morse, 2017). Alternately, taste-based discrimination (Becker 1957) implies that prospective 
supporters reject minority founders, irrespective of their qualifications, out of their own distaste for 
minorities more broadly. 
Crowdfunding moves the locus of funding decisions away from a small pool of experts and spreads 
them out across a much broader population of potential contributors. While crowdfunding platforms 
presumably remove one of the primary causes of racial disparities in entrepreneurship (access to 
capital), recent studies indicate that minority founders continue to face significant bias even on 
these platforms. If, indeed, Herzenstein et al. (2008) find that P2P lenders are less influenced by 
racial stereotypes than are banks, racial bias is found by Pope and Sydnor (2011) in Prosper.com. 
Duarte et al. (2012) show that P2P lenders rely on impressionistic short-hand information such as 
prospects’ appearance. Crowdfunding is indeed a context in which the race of the founder is readily 
apparent and easily identified by potential backers, making it more plausible that founder race 
influences backer behaviour. Younkin and Kuppuswamy (2017) find that minority founders face 
price discounts, rooted in an assumption that minority founders invest less time and have lesser 
aspirations. Using experimental data, Younkin and Kuppuswamy (2018) find that despite the 
promise of crowdfunding, prospective funders remain biased against African American founders. 
They explain these results using Becker’s (1957) theory of consumer discrimination. 
In this paper, we move from consumer theory to finance, to text for the first time the effect of 
ethnicity in equity crowdfunding. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Companies with TMT members belonging to minorities have higher chances to 
successfully complete an equity crowdfunding offering. 
 
2.4. Geography 
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The VC literature has frequently noted that the likelihood of investing in a venture decreases with 
geographic distance, because of, e.g., due diligence costs and ongoing monitoring efforts (see 
Sorenson and Stuart 2001). More broadly, finance literature shows that investors tend to prefer 
geographically close investment opportunities (see, e.g., French and Poterba 1991; Sulaeman 
(2014). The arguments for such preference, and related “home bias” are related to lower 
information asymmetries, better monitoring capabilities and lower associated costs (Coval and 
Moskowitz 2001). In crowdfunding, equal and close to zero cost access to portals should facilitate 
exposure, increase familiarity, and improve access to information about entrepreneurial projects for 
investors. Thus, geographic distance should largely cease to matter to investors. Coherently, 
policymakers have identified crowdfunding as a promising means to cost-effectively bridge 
geographic boundaries. They hope to at least partially eliminate distance-related economic frictions 
that are apparent in the early-stage VC market through these types of internet-based funding 
platforms (Lin and Viswanathan 2016). As asserted by Agrawal et al. (2011), the online platform 
seems indeed to reduce some distance-related economic frictions such as monitoring progress, 
providing input, and gathering information. 
Equity crowdfunding is therefore expected to increase the opportunity of financing for remotely 
located and less connected individuals. Nevertheless, social connections tend to exist locally not 
just in physical space but also in social space. Afonso et al. (2014) demonstrate that personal 
interaction is a desirable ingredient in relationship banking. Social network connections between 
investors and entrepreneurs are found to valuable also in reward-based (Colombo et al., 2014; 
Polzin et al., 2018) and in equity crowdfunding (Vismara, 2016). Hence, needing real-world 
connections limits the scope of information advantages in the crowd. Moreover, challenges of 
investment protection might become an impediment when investing outside of the home country. 
Despite equity crowdfunding should overcome geographical barriers, the first evidence is that 
geographical proximity matters. Ordadini et al. (2011) find that investors in reward-based 
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crowdfunding are often located in the same geographical area as the proponent. Guenther et al. 
(2018) find that very few investors and companies are located in rural areas. Burtch et al. (2014) 
confirm that P2P lenders prefer culturally similar and geographically proximate borrowers. 
There are therefore conflicting arguments about the geographical aspects of crowdfunding. 
However, if distance is not as important as before, as its online, this means that traditionally 
constraints business should “tap” this new opportunity. This means that, relative to traditional 
finance markets, equity crowdfunding should be more attractive for remotely located companies. 
For this reason, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4a. Remotely located companies are more likely to launch equity crowdfunding 
offerings than IPOs. 
Hypothesis 4b. Remotely located companies have higher chances to successfully complete an equity 
crowdfunding offering. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Sample 
Given that our analysis aims, first, to compare the access to alternative sources of financing for 
young entrepreneurial ventures, namely crowdfunding and initial public offerings (IPOs), we need 
to set up a dataset comprising both types of offerings. In this respect, the UK market is a natural 
testing bed, given the presence of one of the most popular second markets for IPOs in the world, the 
AIM (Alternative Investment Market), as well as that of a well-developed platform for 
crowdfunding platform such as Crowdcube. Indeed, extant literature has largely discussed how the 
AIM is preferred by firms that do not meet the listing requirements of the prime market (Baker et 
al., 2002; Ritter et al., 2013; Vismara et al., 2012), and its popularity is largely due to flexible listing 
requirements. Crowdcube, on the other hand, is by far the largest equity crowdfunding platform in 
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the UK, which, is the largest equity crowdfunding market (Estrin et al., 2018)4. Established in 2011, 
Crowdcube is, as of February 2017, the world’s largest platform, with £215 million successfully 
raised from more than 350,000 investors from over 100 countries. Extant literature has discussed 
how the regulation of equity crowdfunding in the UK is often put forward as an important 
ingredient of its development, so that it serves as a model for other legislations (Steinhoff, 2015), 
and how the specific regulatory framework provided by Crowdcube has allowed a lively 
participation of crowd as well as professional investors (Cumming et al., 2018). Moreover, the 
emergence and the optimal regulation of equity crowdfunding can be achieved only in the presence 
of developed alternative entrepreneurial finance markets (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017). In 
summary, the contemporaneous existence of AIM and Crowdcube allows an analysis of the choice 
of sources of entrepreneurial financing.  
Indeed, we have to take into consideration the fact that Crowdcube has been recently launched and 
that an IPO, even on an exchange-regulated market, provides costs that require a minimum 
investment scale. Therefore, in order to identify only those issues that were potentially the object of 
an offering on the AIM or on Crowdcube, we selected Crowdcube’s and AIM’s offerings that were 
placed between 2013 and 2016, raising more than £300,000 and less than £5 million. This 
procedure has lead us to identify a list of 167 equity offerings offered on Crowdcube and 99 IPOs 
on the AIM5. 
 
3.2. Model 
4 Crowdcube has raised more capital than all other competing platforms (AltFi.com, 2015). Different sources agree on 
the leading role of Crowdcube. Beauhurst names Crowdcube as the leading equity investor in 2015 and the most prolific 
investor in the e-commerce sector. Crowdsurfer estimates Crowdcube’s share in the UK investment crowdfunding 
market in 2015 at 52%. 
5 The £300,000 lower boundary has been chosen in order to drop out a 1% share of extremely small IPOs on the AIM. 
The £5,000,000 upper boundary has been chosen in order to drop out a less than 1% share of extremely large 
crowdfunding campaigns. In between, we have a sample of 167 equity crowdfunding campaigns (out of our full sample 
of, 643 campaigns) and 99 IPOs on the AIM (out of the population of 224 IPOs), comparable in size. While we are 
aware that the two subsamples may not perfectly poolable, and this is why we try to control for as many variable as 
possible, when trying to collect such an amount of money, a venture has had the possibility to opt either for a 
crowdfunding campaign or for an IPO on the AIM, conditional on several variables. The goal of our first stage is indeed 
to try and identify how such contextual variables are correlated with the choice of financing mechanism. 
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Our analysis comes in two stages. In a first stage, we aim to disentangle whether the features 
traditionally linked to the limited availability of funding (gender, age, and regional remoteness), 
drive the choice of financing source towards crowdfunding, vis-à-vis IPOs on the AIM. This 
analysis aims to provide empirical support for hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 4a. In a second stage, we 
analyse whether the same determinants are correlated with the success of crowdfunding offerings 
(in terms of probability to reach the target, or in terms of number of investors). This stage aims to 
validate hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3 and 4b.  
Indeed, the features increasing the likelihood to choose a crowdfunding offering versus an IPO on 
the AIM may be at the same time determinants of success. Therefore, we need to deal with a 
potential sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979), by estimating the two following system of 
equations6: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾1 + 𝐶𝐶1𝑖𝑖        [1]  
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 =  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽1 + λ1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖        [2] 
And: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾2 + 𝐶𝐶2𝑖𝑖         [3] 
𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 =  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽2 + λ2𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖       [4] 
Where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms choosing a crowdfunding 
offering; 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 and 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 are the dependent variables in the second stages; 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖′ and 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
′ contain the observable determinants of the latent propensity to prefer a crowdfunding offering 
over a listing on the AIM, and of the dependent variables in the second stages, respectively; 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is 
the inverse Mill’s ratio proposed by Heckman, estimated out of the first stage and included in the 
second stage in order to account for the potential bias caused by the sample selection described 
6 Each system is a pair of equation, where the former is the selection equation and the latter the outcome equation. 
Following Heckman (1979) the two equations are estimated sequentially (first and second stage), in order to grant the 
correct estimation of the IMR’s standard errors.  
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above. Given that this 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 accounts for the unobservable component in the decision to choose a 
crowdfunding initiative over a listing in the AIM, we are identifying this parameter as Prone-to-
Crowdfunding in our regression setting7. 
The second stage measures the success of equity crowdfunding offerings. Therefore, we compare 
both successful and failed crowdfunding campaigns against only successful IPOs. This is done for 
two reasons. First, differently from what happens in the United States, IPOs are infrequently 
withdrawn in Europe (Ritter, 2003). In our sample period, less than 5% of the IPOs on the AIM 
have been withdrawn during the process. Second, while failing to reach the target capital in an 
equity crowdfunding offerings is due to an insufficient demand for shares, an IPO withdrawal can 
be a positive event, as IPOs are often withdrawn due to superior option for cashing out options for 
entrepreneurs (Boeh and Dunbar, 2013). 
Given that the dependent variable in equation 2 is a dummy variable, the system composed by 
equation 1 and 2 is a probit model8 with sample selection, and can be estimated according to Van de 
Ven and Van Pragg (1988). By contrast, the dependent variable in equation 4 is a count variable, 
such that the system composed by equation 3 and 4 is a count model, namely a negative binomial 
regression model, with sample selection, which can be estimated according to Terza (1998). 
 
3.3. Variables 
In the first stage of our analysis, the dependent variable is a dummy identifying crowdfunding 
initiatives in a sample comprising crowdfunding offerings and IPOs on the AIM. In the second 
7 Please consider that, following Heckman (1979), 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖′ should grant identification by an exclusion restriction, i.e. there 
should be at least one parameter excluded from 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖′. In our setting, the exclusion restriction is given by the presence in 
the first stage of industry dummies. 
8 In the case of binary dependent variable, it is common practice to use either Logit or Probit models, with preference 
for the one or the other often based on empirical issues. In our case, given that we need to implement a model with 
sample selection, we need to rely on the Heckman (1979) assumption that both error terms (in the selection and in the 
outcome equation) are normally distributed, in order to calculated and use the Inverse Mill’s Ratio. This is why, in line 
with previous literature, we opt for a Probit, rather than a Logit model, for both our equations. This choice grants 
estimation feasibility according to Ven and Van Pragg (1988). 
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stage, limited to crowdfunding offerings, our analyses are performed with reference to two 
alternative measures of performance.  
First, we investigate the determinants of Success, a dummy variable equal to 1 for successful 
offerings. Second, we look at investor participation in crowdfunding offerings. Our variable here is 
the Number of investors participating in the offering as an alternative dependent variable assessing 
the success in terms of investor participation.  
In both stages, our goal is that of identifying the effects of characteristics typically associated with 
financial constraints. In order to test hypotheses 1a and 1b, we use Female leadership, a dummy 
variable equal to one when the majority of the members in the TMT are women9. We took several 
steps to code genders based on first names. We first algorithmically used the API of genderize.io. 
The algorithm returns the gender and a probability that a specific name-gender attribution (male or 
female) was correct. In a second step, a research assistant double-checked the accuracy of the codes 
and completed the missing variables, with additional help from the pictures displayed on the 
platform website. Hypotheses 2a and 2b are tested by including Age in our model, namely the 
average age of all members of the TMT, calculated at the end of 2016, the latest point in our 
sample. Hypothesis 3 is tested by using Ethnical minority, a dummy variable, equal to 1 if at least 
one member of the TMT is non-Caucasian10. To obtain such information, we had at least two 
separate raters visit the project webpage and examine the photo associated with the entrepreneurial 
team. Ethnical minority take the value 1 only if all raters agreed that one of the team members is 
non-Caucasian, as in Herzenstein et al. (2008). This approach captures the perceived identity of the 
founder irrespective of self-identification. We used a conservative measure, which requires full 
agreement. In cases of disagreement, the offerings were removed from the study. Last, Hypotheses 
9 The simple presence of women in the TMT is also tested in the robustness analysis, by replacing Female leadership 
with Female presence, a dummy variable equal to 1 for all offerings when at least one woman belongs to the TMT of 
the focal firm. 
10 This variable is not available for our sample of IPOs, and is therefore used only in the second stage analysis. 
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4a and 4b are tested by using Metropolitan area11, a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm belongs 
to a metropolitan area, according to the Census 2011 classification (i.e. metropolitan areas of 
London, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds-Bradford, Liverpool-Birkenhead, Newcastle, Sheffield, 
South Hampshire, Nottingham-Derby, and Glasgow). 
To control for potential variation in the quality of the projects, we include in all our analyses a 
series of variables concerning the project and its proponents, collected through the presentation 
pages for each project made available by Crowdcube, and through the prospectus in the case of 
IPOs: Equity offered is the share of equity made available for the crowdfunding campaign, or for 
the offering on the AIM; Target is the amount bid for crowdfunding initiatives, and total proceeds 
for IPO offerings; Firm Age is the difference, in years, between the beginning of the crowdfunding 
campaign, or the offering on the AIM, and the foundation date; TMT size is the number of people in 
the top management team (TMT members are identified in the “team” section of each offering, as 
reported on the platform’s portal); Positive sales is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has 
already reported positive sales at the campaign/IPO; Patents is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company owns or is filing patents at the campaign/IPO; and Population refers to inhabitants in the 
NUTS-312 area where the firm is located. In order to grant the identification conditions required by 
Heckman (1979), the set of controls in the first stage is increased by the inclusion of industry 
dummies13.   
11 In the robustness analysis, this variable is replaced with GDP per capita and Unemployment rate, both measured at 
the NUTS-3 level. 
12 The Classification of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS; French: Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques) 
is a geocode standard for referencing the subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes, developed and regulated by 
the European Union. For each EU member country, a hierarchy of three NUTS levels is established by Eurostat in 
agreement with each member state. In the UK, the NUTS-3 level refers to upper tier authorities and groups of unitary 
authorities and districts: there are 93 NUT-3 areas in England, 12 in Wales, 23 in Scotland and 5 in Northern Ireland. 
13 We make use of 9 dummies, according to the first digit (industry) of the ICB, the Industry Classification Benchmark, 
a taxonomy launched by Dow Jones and FTSE in 2005 and now owned solely by FTSE International. Notice that ICB is 
available from prospectuses for IPOs, while it has been manually identified for Crowdcube’s campaign, based on the 
industry description available on the platform. We are aware that the set of industry dummies is likely to potentially 
affect the outcome of a crowdfunding campaign. Empirically, in our setting we tested for the excludability condition 
through the Hansen’s J test. The joint null hypothesis of this test is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., 
excludable from the outcome equation, and the p value states the probability that the test statistic is zero, which would 
imply acceptance of the null hypothesis. Given that p is much greater than 10% in our case, we have evidence 
supporting our choice. 
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In Table 1, a summary of variable description is provided.  
 
[INSERT SOMEWHERE HERE TABLE 1] 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables employed in our analyses. Our sample is 
composed of 167 equity offerings on Crowdcube and 99 IPOs on the AIM, each of them raising 
more than £300,000 and less than £5 million, between 2013 and 2016. 48.5 of crowdfunding 
campaigns have been successful, with an average of 237.9 investors involved. 
Descriptive statistics on the explanatory variables provide univariate evidence on the different 
attractiveness of crowdfunding and IPOs for financially constrained categories. No statistically 
significant difference is found for Female leadership, though when looking at Female presence one 
can notice how the vast majority of IPOs provides for at least one female member in the TMT 
(81.3%), differently from crowdfunding offering, where a woman is present in 52.1% of the 
campaigns. Crowdfunding offerings are preferred by younger teams, with an average age of 42, 
with respect to 46.2 average years of an IPO’s TMT. Further, a large majority of IPOs are 
performed by firms located in metropolitan areas (57.2%), with respect to a limited 50.4% of 
crowdfunding campaigns. This corresponds to areas promoting crowdfunding offerings 
characterized by a smaller population, lower GDP per capita and lower unemployment rates, with 
respect to the average NUTS-3 are promoting an IPO. Last, crowdfunding offerings campaigns 
involve ethnical minorities in 16% of cases.  
Indeed, crowdfunding and IPOs differ also under several perspectives which are controlled in our 
analysis. Crowdfunding offerings, on average, offer a smaller percentage of equity (15.7 vs. 33.3), 
are much smaller in size (£925,000 vs £2,312.1) and TMT size (3.5 vs. 5 members). Firms are 
similar in age and have reported positive sales in half of the cases both in crowdfunding (49.2%) 
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and IPOs (50.4), although crowdfunding firms have patented less often (19.7% of cases) than IPO 
counterparts (36.8%). 
Correlations among all variables employed in this study are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
[INSERT SOMEWHERE HERE TABLE 2] 
 
4. Results 
Our analyses provide validation for our hypotheses with the two-stage models presented in equation 
1-2 and 3-4. Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 4a are tested in the first stage, while Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3 and 
4b in the second stages.  
First-stage results are reported in the first column of Table 314. We find evidence that crowdfunding 
initiatives are preferred by younger TMTs (the coefficient for Age is equal to -0.033, and 
statistically significant at a 5% level), and by firms out of metropolitan areas (the coefficient for 
Metropolitan area is equal to -0.874, significant at a 1% level, implies lower probability of 
crowdfunding for firms located in urban areas, with respect to rural/remote areas, and vice versa). 
No statistical significance is found with respect to Female leadership. Our results, therefore, 
provide support for Hypotheses 2a and 4a, while we do not have statistical evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 1a. 
As far as control variables are concerned, we find confirmation of differences highlighted by 
descriptive statistics, in that crowdfunding initiatives are more likely in the case of smaller equity 
offered, smaller target, smaller TMT size, and smaller population for the NUTS-3 area of origin. 
14 A first stage is estimated for all second-stage equation presented. Given that results are qualitatively identical, and 
numerically extremely close, the first-stage equation is reported only once. 
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Models (2) to (6) in Table 3 reports our result on the determinants of success for the crowdfunding 
initiatives in our sample. Model (1) reports a baseline specification with all control variables. 
Models from (2) to (5) include a variable testing for the role of gender, age, ethnical minority and 
regional features, respectively, while Model (6) jointly test for the presence of all these 
characteristics. Our results show that female leadership and presence of ethnical minorities do not 
statistically impact on the success of crowdfunding offerings, while younger TMTs and campaigns 
from non-metropolitan areas are more likely to succeed (as provided by the negative sign of the 
Metropolitan area dummy). Results are confirmed both when separately assessed and when jointly 
tested, and provide support for Hypotheses 2b and 4b, while we do not have enough statistical 
evidence to confirm Hypotheses 1b, and 3. 
As far as the control variables are concerned, we find confirmation of findings in previous literature 
in that both the share of equity offered and the target size reduce the probability of success. 
Interestingly, the coefficient for the inverse Mill’s ratio, i.e. our measure of how Prone to 
crowdfunding is any offering, is negative and statistically significant in all models (either at 5 or 
10%). In practise, those features increasing the likelihood to choose a crowdfunding offering over 
an IPO are negatively correlated to the probability of success. 
 
[INSERT SOMEWHERE HERE TABLE 3] 
 
In Table 4, we replicate the former analysis, after replacing Success with the Number of investors as 
an outcome dependent variable. Again, model (1) reports a baseline specification with all control 
variables, Models from (2) to (5) include a variable testing for the role of gender, age, ethnical 
minority and regional features, respectively, while Model (6) jointly test for the presence of all 
these characteristics. Results from the last Model show that Age is weakly significant in 
determining the number of participating investors, such that younger TMTs typically attract more 
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the crowd (coefficient=-0.007, significant at less than 10%). Also offerings with a presence of an 
Ethnical minority (coefficient=0.158, significant at less than 5%) and originated in non-
metropolitan areas (coefficient of Metropolitan area=-0.216, significant at less than 5%) have 
higher likelihood to attract a high number of investors, while no statistically significant effect is 
found with respect to a Female leadership. These results are in support of Hypotheses 2b, 3 and 4b, 
while again we do not have enough statistical significance in support of Hypothesis 1b. 
As far as controls are concerned, we find evidence that higher targets typically attract a larger 
number of investors, while we have weak evidence that a large TMT size reduces the number of 
investors. Our results also show how Positive Sales and Patents are interesting features in the eyes 
of investors. Interestingly, the coefficient of the IMR is positive and significant, such that features 
increasing the likelihood of a crowdfunding offering, over an IPO, are correlated to a larger number 
of participating investors. This result, interestingly, differs from what has been observed in the 
former table, highlighting that unobserved determinants of preference for crowdfunding over IPOs 
positively affect the attraction of investors, but have a (weak) negative impact on the probability to 
succeed. This may be due to a capability to attract a large number of small investors, i.e. by hype 
creation, while not necessarily attracting enough funds for the success of the campaign.  
 
[INSERT SOMEWHERE HERE TABLE 4] 
 
4.1. Robustness analysis 
In this section, we provide robustness analysis with respect to the variables employed for testing our 
hypothesis. First, we test whether the presence of a woman (Female presence), rather than the 
leadership in the team, might have an impact in the choice of a crowdfunding initiative, and in the 
following success. Second, we replace our Metropolitan area dummy with variables measuring 
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specific features of the local area, such as the GDP per capita and the Unemployment rate. Last, our 
findings with regard to geography might indeed depend on some specificities of the United 
Kingdom. While we cannot rule out this possibility, we acknowledge that (1) distance might matters 
less in the UK than in other countries, and (2) the leading role of London as financial centre might 
condition our results. Third, we take into account the specificity of the UK geographical context, 
repeating our analysis either including dummy variables for the 9 NUT-2 regions in the UK15 or 
dropping all observations for firms located in London. 
All our robustness checks are reported in Table 5. Models A1-5 repeat our first stage when 
replacing Female leadership with Female presence (Model A1), Metropolitan area with GDP per 
capita (Model A2), Metropolitan area with Unemployment rate (Model A3), when including 
regional dummies (Model A4) and when dropping London offerings (Model A5). Results show that 
Female presence is negatively correlated to the probability to choose a crowdfunding initiative over 
an IPO. This is likely to be due to the larger TMT size of IPO firms, as well as to the greater 
attention to gender equality in official listing. GDP per capita and Unemployment, vice versa, are 
not correlated to the likelihood to prefer a crowdfunding offering, although the signs (negative for 
GDP per capita and positive for Unemployment) are coherent with the intuition that disadvantaged 
areas are more likely to give raise to crowdfunding initiatives. 
Models B1-5 and C1-5 report the results of our second stages. Again, we replace Female leadership 
with Female presence (Models B1 and C1), Metropolitan area with GDP per capita (Models B2 
and C2), and Metropolitan area with Unemployment rate (Models B3 and C3), when including 
regional dummies (Models B4 and C4) and when dropping London offerings (Models B5 and C5). 
Our results show that Female presence does not significantly impact on the success of a 
crowdfunding campaign, nor on the number of investors. As far as GDP per capita and 
15 There are 12 NUTS-1 statistical regions in the UK: Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and 9 regions for England 
(North East; North West; Yorkshire and the Humber; East Midlands; West Midlands; East of England; Greater London; 
South East and South West). Greater London is the reference case. See footnote 10 for details on the NUTS 
classifications. 
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Unemployment rate are concerned, coefficients are weakly significant when analysing the Number 
of investors. Again, the signs support that disadvantaged areas (with lower GDP per capita and 
higher Unemployment rate) are more likely to generate a large participation of investors. Signs are 
coherent, but no statistical significance is found, with respect to the probability of success. Finally, 
when including regional dummies our results are qualitatively unchanged, while when removing 
London offerings, our findings are confirmed, with lower significance in a few cases, probably 
because of the smaller sample size. 
 
[INSERT SOMEWHERE HERE TABLE 5] 
 
5. Conclusions 
Although a growing number of studies are exploring the nuances of crowdfunding and its various 
online platforms, research in this field is rapidly expanding (Block et al., 2018). The general 
expectation is that crowdfunding “democratizes” entrepreneurial finance, thereby increasing the 
possibility of underrepresented categories to raise finance. Gender, age, ethnicity, and geography 
are among the most important aspects that affect the capacity to gain access to external capital. This 
problem holds true for both debt and equity financing, where female, minorities and rural 
entrepreneurs may face discrimination from external funding sources. Despite such premises, our 
understanding of whether and how such characteristics of prospective entrepreneurs play in raising 
funds in equity crowdfunding is still missing. 
This study offers a timely contribution to the growing stream of research seeking to unveil 
the possibilities of equity crowdfunding in facilitating entrepreneurship for those most vulnerable. 
First, we find that age matters in equity crowdfunding, as companies with younger TMT members 
are both more likely to launch equity crowdfunding offerings than IPOs, and have higher chances to 
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successfully complete an equity crowdfunding offering. This is a novel result in the crowdfunding 
literature. Second, we find evidence that equity crowdfunding alleviates some of the distance-
related economic frictions between entrepreneurs and investors. Indeed, remotely located 
companies are more likely to launch equity crowdfunding offerings than IPOs and have higher 
chances to successfully complete an equity crowdfunding offering. On the contrary, female 
entrepreneurs, typically considered financially constrained in traditional entrepreneurial markets, do 
not have higher chances to raise funds in equity crowdfunding. Similarly, minority entrepreneurs do 
not have higher chances of successfully raising capital. Nevertheless, this type of entrepreneurs is 
associated with a higher number of investors. We interpret this evidence as a higher sensitivity to 
ethnicity from small investors, relative to professional investors. Equity crowdfunding offerings, 
indeed, attract small and professional investors alike. As these two types of investors have been 
found to have different investment preferences (Signori and Vismara, 2018), their attitude towards 
ethnicity is likely to be different. Future research might dig deeper in this direction, also leveraging 
the insights from institutional logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991). While professional investors 
might follow a market logic, small investors might also consider a community logic (Vismara, 
2018b). This would explain why ethnic entrepreneurs attract a higher number of investors but are at 
the end not more likely to secure their target funding. 
Future research might expand the assessment of the democratization potential of equity 
crowdfunding from the demand side (entrepreneurs) to the supply side (investors), thereby 
delivering a better understanding of the financial inclusion offered by disintermediated 
entrepreneurial finance. Relatedly, studies are needed with regard to the matching between 
entrepreneurs and investors. Research in entrepreneurship indicates that investors are attracted to 
entrepreneurs with whom they share similarities. For instance, co-ethnicity increases the likelihood 
that a VC firm invests in a company (Bengtsson and Hsu, 2015). The diverse backgrounds of 
participants in equity crowdfunding markets permit researchers greater nuance in studying the 
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influence of similarity attraction in funding decisions. While we have investigated democratization 
along four dimensions of constraints, other aspects are of interest. For instance, the socio-economic 
status or the religion of proponents have not been investigated yet. In a preliminary analysis of the 
videos used to present the offerings in our sample, we could not find any religious symbol. 
Beautiful people seem to attract more favorable peer-to-peer loans (Ravina, 2012). Given 
crowdfunding applications gain less publicity (and may be less face-to-face than other means of 
negotiating to obtain financing), could it democratize for less beautiful people?   
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Table 1. Variable description 
 
Dependent variables 
Success Dummy variable equal to 1 for successfully funded offerings, 0 otherwise. 
Number of investors Number of investors in the offering. 
Explanatory variables 
Female leadership Dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with the CEO of the firms is a woman, 0 otherwise. 
Age Average age of TMT members.  
Ethnical minority Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one TMT member if at least one member of the TMT is non-Caucasian 
Metropolitan area 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm belongs to a metropolitan area, according to the 
Census 2001 classification (i.e. metropolitan areas of London, Birmingham, Manchester, 
Leeds-Bradford, Liverpool-Birkenhead, Newcastle, Sheffield, South Hampshire, 
Nottingham-Derby and Glasgow) 
Controls 
Equity offered Percentage of equity offered. 
Target Amount bid for crowdfunding initiatives, and total proceeds for IPO offerings (natural logarithms are used in regression analyses). 
Firm age Difference, in years, between the beginning of the crowdfunding campaign, or the offering on the AIM, and the foundation date. 
TMT size Number of people in the top management team. 
Positive sales Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has already reported positive sales at the campaign/IPO, 0 otherwise.  
Patents Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company owns or is filing patents at the campaign/IPO, 0 otherwise. 
Population Population in the NUTS-3 area where the firm is located (natural logarithms are used in regression analyses). 
Additional controls in the selection process 
Industry dummies Set of dummy variables controlling for industries according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
Variables included in the robustness analysis 
Female presence Dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with at least one woman in the TMT. 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in the NUTS-3 area where the firm is located (natural logarithms are used in regression analyses). 
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate in the NUTS-3 area where the firm is located. 
NUTS-1 dummies Set of dummy variables controlling for the 12 NUTS-1 statistical regions in the UK. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics. Mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values for all variables employed in the analysis, refereed to the 
sample of 167 equity offerings on Crowdcube and to the sample of 99 IPOs on the AIM raising more than £300,000 and less than £5 million 
between 2013 and 2016. The last column reports tests for difference in means (or proportions) between equity offerings on Crowdcube and AIM. 
***, ** and * represent statistical significance, at 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. 
 Crowdcube  AIM Difference in 
Means  Mean Std Max Min  Mean Std Max Min 
 Depedent variables 
Success (dummy, %) 48.5 50.1 1 0  - - - - - 
Number of investors (No.) 237.9 325.8 2,209 3  - - - - - 
Explanatory variables           
Female leadership (dummy, %) 31.2 46.4 1 0  36.8 48.2 1 0 5.6 
Age (years) 42.0 9.8 72 20  46.2 9.0 79 25 4.2*** 
Ethnical minority (dummy, %) 16.0 36.9 1 0  - - - - - 
Metropolitan area (dummy, %) 50.4 50.1 1 0  57.2 49.5 1 0 6.8* 
Controls           
Equity offered (%) 15.7 8.30 54.3 2.3  33.3 23.3 89.1 9.0 17.6*** 
Target (000£) 925.0 530.5 3,990.0 300.0  2,312.1 1,392.8 5,000 300.0 1,387.1*** 
Firm age (years) 3.1 3.3 20 0  3.4 3.9 22 0 0.8 
TMT size (No.) 3.5 1.4 7 1  5.0 1.5 12 2 1.5*** 
Positive sales (dummy, %) 49.2 45.6 1 0  50.4 50.1 1 0 0.8 
Patents (dummy, %) 19.7 39.9 1 0  36.8 48.2 1 0 17.1*** 
Population (millions) 4.1 3.9 8.8 0.1  4.9 3.8 8.8 0.1 0.8** 
 Variables included in the robustness analysis 
Female presence (dummy, %) 52.1 50.1 1 0  81.3 39.0 1 0 29.2*** 
GDP per capita (000£) 58.0 24.5 86.4 24.9  61.7 24.8 86.4 24.9 3.7* 
Unemployment rate (%) 4.8 1.1 7.2 2.7  5.1 10.9 7.2 2.7 0.3* 
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Table 3. Probability of success. The table reports the results of Probit models with a selection equation, i.e. a two-stage model. The first stage 
(selection equation) is a probit model on the likelihood to propose a crowdfunding offerings, vis-à-vis a public offering on the AIM, estimated on a 
sample of 167 offerings offered on Crowdcube and 99 IPOs on the AIM between 2013 and 2016. The identification condition is granted by the 
inclusion of Industry dummies in the regression specification. The first stage is reported only for the selection equation of Model (1). Results for all 
the other selection equations are qualitatively the same. The second stage is a probit model on the success of crowdfunding offerings, estimated on a 
sample of 167 equity offerings offered on Crowdcube, and including the Inverse Mills Ratio esatimated from the first model. Model (1) is our 
baseline specification. Model (2) adds Female leadership. Model (3) adds Age. Model (4) adds Ethnical minority. Model (5) adds Metropolitan area. 
Model (6) adds all variables included in Models (2-5). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * identify significance levels at less than 
1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
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 Crowdfunding (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female leadership -0.416 - 0.602 - - - 0.572 
 (0.269)  (0.498)    (0.462) 
Age -0.033** - - -0.047*** - - -0.045*** 
 (0.013)   (0.017)   (0.016) 
Ethnical minority - - - - 0.137 - 0.077 
     (0.377)  (0.354) 
Metropolitan area 0.874*** - - - - -0.532* -0.480* 
 (0.235)     (0.312) (0.286) 
Equity offered -5.089*** -2.502 -2.857 -3.607** -2.636 -3.011* -4.230** 
 (1.183) (1.723) (1.798) (1.691) (1.767) (1.746) (1.789) 
Target -0.498*** -1.133*** -1.180*** -1.246*** -1.141*** -1.177*** -1.300*** 
 (0.151) (0.157) (0.168) (0.164) (0.154) (0.155) (0.161) 
Firm age 0.035 0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 -0.009 
 (0.046) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
TMT size -0.584*** -0.072 -0.010 -0.035 -0.067 -0.043 0.048 
 (0.109) (0.160) (0.173) (0.178) (0.163) (0.158) (0.188) 
Positive sales 0.266 0.093 0.044 0.051 0.095 0.037 0.031 
 (0.275) (0.299) (0.302) (0.309) (0.300) (0.299) (0.312) 
Patents 0.350 0.529 0.518 0.433 0.537 0.450 0.367 
 (0.280) (0.356) (0.349) (0.365) (0.357) (0.372) (0.374) 
Population -0.335*** 0.029 0.022 -0.027 0.023 0.182 0.113 
 (0.092) (0.098) (0.098) (0.101) (0.100) (0.167) (0.168) 
Prone to crowdfunding (IMR) - 0.134 -0.975** -0.985** -0.991** -0.906* -0.993** 
  (0.689) (0.444) (0.447) (0.424) (0.503) (0.421) 
Industry dummies YES*** NO NO NO NO NO NO 
        
Constant -13.553*** -14.209*** -12.410*** -13.617*** -16.150*** -15.231*** -13.553*** 
 (2.348) (2.632) (2.436) (2.304) (3.134) (3.177) (2.348) 
Observations 266 167 167 167 167 167 167 
Pseudo R-squared 0.73 0.32 0.34 0.43 0.39 0.42 0.48 
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Table 4. Number of investors. The table reports the results of Negative binomial regressions with a selection equation, i.e. a two-stage model. The 
first stage (selection equation) is a probit model on the likelihood to propose a crowdfunding offering, vis-à-vis a public offering on the AIM, 
estimated on a sample of 167 offerings offered on Crowdcube and 99 IPOs on the AIM between 2013 and 2016. The identification condition is 
granted by the inclusion of Size and Industry dummies in the regression specification. The first stage is not reported, as coefficients are in all cases 
qualitatively the same as in the model reported in Table 3, Model 1. The second stage is a negative binomial regression on the number of investors, 
estimated on a sample of 167 equity offerings offered on Crowdcube, and including the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from the first model. Model 
(1) is our baseline specification. Model (2) adds Female leadership. Model (3) adds Age. Model (4) adds Ethnical minority. Model (5) adds 
Metropolitan area. Model (6) adds all variables included in Models (2-5). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * identify significance 
levels at less than 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female leadership - 0.038 - - - 0.035 
  (0.156)    (0.146) 
Age - - -0.008* - - -0.007* 
   (0.004)   (0.004) 
Ethnical minority - - - 0.149** - 0.158** 
    (0.068)  (0.076) 
Metropolitan area - - - - -0.273** -0.216** 
     (0.115) (0.103) 
Equity offered -0.835* -0.819 -0.836* -0.684 -0.703 -0.519 
 (0.492) (0.507) (0.492) (0.501) (0.473) (0.488) 
Target 0.546*** 0.547*** 0.546*** 0.549*** 0.553*** 0.556*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Firm age 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
TMT size -0.104** -0.101* -0.105** -0.104** -0.094* -0.089* 
 (0.051) (0.055) (0.050) (0.051) (0.049) (0.052) 
Positive sales 0.273*** 0.270*** 0.273*** 0.281*** 0.257*** 0.262*** 
 (0.090) (0.094) (0.090) (0.092) (0.088) (0.093) 
Patents 0.229** 0.231** 0.229** 0.263*** 0.205** 0.241*** 
 (0.098) (0.098) (0.097) (0.092) (0.097) (0.093) 
Population -0.067** -0.066** -0.067** -0.073*** -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.038) (0.036) 
Prone to Crowdfunding (IMR) 0.457*** 0.449*** 0.457*** 0.429*** 0.432*** 0.390*** 
 (0.150) (0.155) (0.150) (0.144) (0.154) (0.151) 
       
Constant -0.014 -0.043 -0.025 0.001 -0.878 -0.943 
 (0.491) (0.501) (0.549) (0.485) (0.640) (0.648) 
Observations 167 167 167 167 167 167 
Pseudo R-squared 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.57 
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Table 5. Robustness analysis.  The table reports the results of robustness analysis on the selection equation reported in the first column of Table 3 
– Crowdfunding (Models A1-4), on the success equation reported in Table 3, Model 6 (Models B1-4) and on the investor equation reported in Table 
4, Model 6 (Models C1-4). Models A1-4 are probit models on the likelihood to propose a crowdfunding offering, vis-à-vis a public offering on the 
AIM. The identification condition is granted by the inclusion of Industry dummies in the regression specification. Models B1-4 are probit models on 
the success of crowdfunding offerings, including the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from the first model (Models A1-3, respectively). Models C1-4 
are negative binomial regressions on the number of investors, and including the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from the first model (not reported, but 
qualitatively equivalent to Models A1-3). In Models A1, B1 and C1, Female presence replaces Female leadership. In Models A2, B2 and C2, GDP 
per capita replaces Metropolitan area. In Models A3, B3 and C3, Unemployment replaces Metropolitan area. In Models A4, B4 and C4, we include 
also a set of dummy variables for the 12 NUTS-1 statistical regions. In Models A5, B5 and C5, offerings from London are dropped. The sample size 
is therefore given by 167 Crowdcube offerings and 99 AIM offerings between 2013 and 2016 in Models A1-A4; 100 offerings on Crowdcube and 
59 offerings on the AIM in Model A5; 167 offerings on Crowdcube in Models B1-B4 and C1-C4; 100 offerings on Crowdcube in Models B5 and 
C5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * identify significance levels at less than 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
 (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5) 
Female leadership - -0.331 -0.339 -0.384 -0.362 - 0.581 0.569 0.670 0.352 - 0.034 0.031 0.221 0.165 
  (0.222) (0.222) (0.270) (0.298)  (0.475) (0.491) (0.604) (0.297)  (0.149) (0.150) (0.202) (0.200) 
Femaly presence -0.969*** - - - - 0.093 - - - - 0.048 - - - - 
 (0.227)     (0.308)     (0.083)     
Age -0.029** -0.026** -0.025** -0.026** -0.019* -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.068*** -0.057*** -0.008** 0.009** 0.009** -0.009** -0.007* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ethnical minority - - - - - 0.084 0.061 0.068 0.051 0.058 0.157* 0.153* 0.144* 0.188* 0.133* 
      (0.353) (0.353) (0.378) (0.521) (0.523) (0.086) (0.087) (0.089) (0.106) (0.076) 
Metropolitan area -0.732*** - - -1.331*** -0.393* -0.446* - - -0.911* -0.529* -0.215* - - -0.215* -0.269** 
 (0.231)   (0.390) (0.218) (0.243)   (0.490) (0.294) (0.113)   (0.118) (0.105) 
GDP per capita - -0.208 - - - - -0.107 - - - - -0.163* - - - 
  (0.398)     (0.581)     (0.068)    
Unemployment - - -1.436 - - - - 1.685 - - - - -3.615* - - 
   (1.564)     (1.899)     (2.175)   
Equity offered -5.361*** -4.513*** -4.423*** -5.721*** -3.644** -4.031** -3.897** -3.978** -8.612*** -9.127*** -0.503 -0.689 -0.671 -0.235 -0.352 
 (1.126) (1.113) (1.099) (1.144) (1.601) (1.753) (1.766) (1.797) (3.341) (2.900) (0.488) (0.527) (0.509) (0.624) (0.582) 
Target -0.549*** -0.444*** -0.457*** -0.463*** -0.525** -1.282*** -1.280*** -1.284*** -1.515*** -1.409*** 0.559*** 0.551*** 0.548*** 0.568*** 0.546*** 
 (0.135) (0.137) (0.135) (0.145) (0.214) (0.163) (0.165) (0.166) (0.240) (0.201) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.032) (0.032) 
Firm age 0.050 0.051 0.048 0.047 -0.001 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.013 -0.001 0.011 0.012 0.012 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.042) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.058) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.058) (0.052) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
TMT size -0.424*** -0.585*** -0.583*** -0.629*** -0.565*** -0.013 0.026 0.019 0.196 0.044 -0.096** -0.102* -0.104* -0.030 -0.092 
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 (0.101) (0.103) (0.104) (0.108) (0.151) (0.170) (0.191) (0.191) (0.206) (0.199) (0.049) (0.053) (0.055) (0.077) (0.070) 
Positive sales -0.027 -0.351 -0.351 -0.198 -0.288 0.016 0.002 0.004 0.561 0.290 0.268*** 0.270*** 0.281*** 0.337*** 0.317** 
 (0.256) (0.273) (0.273) (0.291) (0.297) (0.303) (0.315) (0.311) (0.477) (0.439) (0.089) (0.090) (0.095) (0.128) (0.125) 
Patents -0.234 -0.330 -0.326 -0.497 -0.207 0.364 0.437 0.454 0.463 0.431 0.237*** -0.272*** 0.261*** 0.300** 0.266** 
 (0.280) (0.263) (0.261) (0.305) (0.320) (0.386) (0.363) (0.357) (0.636) (0.507) (0.092) (0.095) (0.092) (0.153) (0.125) 
Population -0.345*** -0.265** -0.111 -0.312*** -0.717*** 0.104 0.001 -0.144 -0.392 -0.086 -0.009 -0.052 -0.049 0.015 -0.054 
 (0.092) (0.133) (0.124) (0.098) (0.131) (0.163) (0.196) (0.176) (0.342) (0.299) (0.037) (0.048) (0.036) (0.069) (0.064) 
Prone to Crowdfunding (IMR) - - - - - -0.796* -0.790* -0.782* -1.100* -0.945 0.390*** 0.415*** 0.428*** 0.466** 0.397*** 
      (0.401) (0.403) (0.420) (0.575) (0.651) (0.145) (0.149) (0.153) (0.193) (0.136) 
Industry dummies YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
NUTS-1 dummies NO NO NO YES*** NO NO NO NO YES*** NO NO NO NO YES*** NO 
Constant 14.896*** 11.180*** 12.015*** 13.432*** 20.724*** -14.710*** -12.304*** -12.255*** -10.134** -13.836*** -1.003 0.416 -0.194 -1.521 -0.207 
 (2.424) (3.656) (2.472) (2.512) (3.618) (3.055) (4.460) (2.652) (4.966) (4.966) (0.653) (1.365) (0.552) (1.022) (0.958) 
Observations 266 266 266 266 159 167 167 167 167 100 167 167 167 167 100 
Pseudo R-squared 0.74 0.70 0.71 0.79 0.77 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.58 0.56 0.56 0.52 0.54 0.64 0.63 
Table A1. Correlation matrix. Correlation coefficients calculated on the sample of 167 equity offerings on Crowdcube, and 99 IPOs on the AIM 
raising more than £300,000 and less than £5 million between 2013 and 2016. Values for Success, Number of investors and Ethnical minorities refer 
only to crowdfunding offerings. * represents statistical significance at 5%. 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Success 1.000               
2 N. of investors 0.345* 1.000              
3 Female leadership 0.006 -0.058 1.000             
4 Age -0.118* -0.157* 0.017 1.000            
5 Ehnical minority 0.073 0.135* 0.082 -0.071 1.000           
6 Metropolitan area -0.107* -0.098* 0.062 -0.052 0.140* 1.000          
7 Equity offered -0.084* -0.057 0.075* 0.037 -0.146* 0.028 1.000         
8 Target -0.278* 0.392* 0.107* 0.148* 0.097* 0.084 0.102* 1.000        
9 Firm Age -0.058 -0.084* -0.014 -0.019 -0.075* -0.006 0.052 0.018 1.000       
10 TMT Size 0.274* 0.249* -0.043 0.135* 0.079 -0.014 0.004 0.580* -0.063 1.000      
11 Positive Sales 0.083* 0.131* 0.006 0.038 -0.029 0.048 0.020 0.047 0.161* 0.047 1.000     
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12 Patents 0.051 0.080* -0.012 0.004 0.113* 0.061 -0.027 0.008 -0.043 0.067 0.068 1.000    
13 Population 0.109* -0.052 0.054 -0.028 0.145* 0.199* -0.033 0.073 -0.036 0.082 -0.032 -0.024 1.000   
14 Female presence -0.056 0.053 0.343 0.064 0.095 -0.004 0.029 0.026 -0.034 0.309 -0.035 0.047 0.022 1.000  
15 GDP per capita -0.117* -0.029 0.043 -0.002 0.144 0.121* -0.020 0.068 -0.040 0.042 -0.029 -0.026 0.596* 0.043 1.000 
16 Unemployment 0.113* -0.033 0.031 -0.029 0.053 0.177* -0.056 0.062 -0.021 0.059 -0.032 -0.012 0.632* -0.013 0.461* 
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